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Rabah Bousbaci and Alain Findeli aesthetics -oriented inquiries, and the process with logic -oriented inquiries), we shall dwell on the last one (the actors) which requires a strong paradigmatic or philosophical shift, towards ethics -oriented inquiries. We try to demonstrate that the philosophical framework of ethics and its key concepts provides an insightful and indeed necessary contribution to architectural theory, and reveals some important aspects to which product-oriented and process-oriented inquiries are sometimes blind. From this perspective, we found Aristotle ' s ethics and its modern commentators (Hannah Arendt and Paul Ricoeur) particularly helpful for constructing a more comprehensive vision of the architectural project that articulates its three basic constituents: the actors , the process , and the building .
A PROJECT … as OBJECT of Study
After four decades of existence within the universities, research in architecture seems to recognise in the notion of project its main object of study 2 . In 1986, having been invited to take part in a debate about research in architecture, Jean-Louis LeMoigne proposed the notion of project as the main object of this research. Inspired by the case of nineteenth century chemistry which, in order to escape the domination of physics created its own object of study, he stated: " [ … ] because it could not found it [the object] in the universe, chemistry created it, ex nihilo , by an intentional and a voluntary act, by a project ! A PROJECT … AS OBJECT ! It ' s a strange circle: a discipline which must have the scientifi c " project " for willing a study " object " , … and a scholar in architecture [ … ] will be surprised to discover instead of an object … a project ! The project to design and to build [ … ] more or less stable forms in a territorial space [ … ] .Therefore, the object of scientifi c research in architecture will be the project? [ … ] If the Object is a Project, and if the Project is a project of the Subject (or for and by the Subject), then the Project unites, in an intelligible way, the Object and the Subject. " 3 Whether we consider it at the symbolic or operational level, the notion of project has achieved a leading status in architecture. It has been associated with all the developments which have affected the historical evolution of this domain of knowledge and professional practice. Also, compared with other social activities, architectural practice was the fi rst modern profession to declare the notion of project as its main framework for structuring both its domain of practice and its teaching programs. Therefore, in his essays about the project ' s anthropology and psychology, Jean-Pierre Boutinet was delighted to remind and outline the architectural origins 4 of this notion which is used today by a growing number of social activities and areas of knowledge 5 . However, in order to assume completely its new status as the main object of architecture ' s knowledge, the idea of project has to be more than a simple notion in the architects ' common vocabulary. This notion must go through some developments, clarifi cations and precisions to become a more rigorous concept able to structure and bring together architecture ' s knowledge.
There is a remarkable diversity of theoretical discourses about the project in architecture. These discourses are like open windows which have offered over history several viewpoints directed toward an aspect, a manifestation or a particular quality of the architectural project. Contemporary and historical treatises of architecture reveal a large variety of descriptive or prescriptive discourses: aesthetics discourses (including even the aesthetics of functionalism); utilitarian discourses; technical discourses; scientifi c and methodo-logical discourses, etc. However, the question remains: which constituents of the project are the real foci of these entire discourses?
If we consider the historical evolution of these discourses, we can see that their focus has shifted through time from the product of the project (i.e., the building) to the process of the project, and, in the last decades, from the process to the actors 6 of the project. Philosophically speaking, the shift corresponds each time to a radical change in the paradigmatic framework of the inquiry: from aesthetics ( product -oriented), to logics ( process -oriented), to ethics ( actors -oriented) 7 . Actually, these three phenomena (building, process, actors) are nothing else than the real objects of research investigations (the three main areas of knowledge) of the discipline of architecture. One of the suitable ways to review briefl y the theoretical discourses about these three phenomena is to consider the main conceptual representations that have been developed through history to portray them. We will start with building ' s representations.
The Building: Some Common Conceptual Lenses
The fi rst and the most popular conceptual representation of the building in architecture is the vitruvian model: the " fi rm , useful , and graceful " building 8 . The interpretation of Vitruvius ' Ten Books on Architecture in Leon Battista Alberti ' s De re aedifi catoria , considered with the study of antique monuments as models to follow, and the imitation ( mimesis ) of nature as a philosophy of aesthetics, are seen by Germann (1991) as the beginning of this tradition which he calls Vitruvianism . By the middle of the 18th century, debates about the principles which underlie architecture and its teaching program witnessed, especially in France, the advent of two schools of thought that can be distinguished as the architect -artist school and the architect -engineer school 9 . Started in the É cole de l ' Acad é mie and carried out along the Beaux-arts tradition, the fi rst promoted an artistic vision of architecture focusing on buildings ' aesthetics (buildings as works of art and spectacles ), since the architectartist was destined to design the monuments and prestigious projects of the king. The architect-engineer school of thought, which appeared in the É cole des Ponts et Chauss é es of Paris, developed a utilitarian and instrumental vision of architecture (buildings were seen as mere means aimed to satisfy human needs ). This school cherished the dream of a scientifi cally based practice of building. Thus, engineers preferred to study issues of utility, fi rmness, and building techniques:
" Amongst the many infl uential events which took place around 1750, few exercised such a profound change on architectural theory as the establishment of civil and military engineering as distinct and separate disciplines. For as Hans Straub has rightly remarked in his History of Civil Engineering: " it was during the second half of the eighteenth century that the science of engineering proper came into existence, and with it the modern civil engineer who based his designs on scientifi c calculation " . " 10 By the second half of the 18th century, the systematic imitations of the architectural styles of antique buildings had become somewhat exhausted, leading to the abandonment of the ideal of beauty promoted by advocates of Vitruvianism . This motivation had pushed architectural theorists in a novelty quest, which can be established as the origins of modern architecture. According to Peter Collins (1998, p. 146) , " functional analogies " were the only way which remained possible for architectural theorists. Among these functional analogies, the most established were the mechanical analogy (the building seen as a machine ) and the biological analogy, i.e., the analogy between buildings and living organisms. The latter gave rise to two models: the " organism/environment " model and " form/function " model 11 . The " organism/environment " model describes living organisms ' relationships to their habitat; its equivalent in architecture is the " man / environment " model in which buildings are seen as the environments for their occupants. From this model developed the behaviorist school of thought in architecture, mostly known as Environment and Behavior Studies ; in the second half of 20th century, this was extended with the concept of " built environment " 12 . The " form / function " model drew on descriptions of biological organisms (such as the relationship between organs and their respective functions. Here, buildings are seen as a set of built forms suited to functions (i.e. human activities).
The Logical Turn: A Focus on Design Process
During two and half centuries, that is, until the 1960 ' s, one conceptual and very practical representation of the design process had prevailed in architecture. This was the compositional model of the Beaux-arts tradition, known by its three main steps: " Esquisse / Development / Final project " . Originally, this model portrayed the competition procedures carried out in the Acad é mie ' s school of architecture: the Concours d ' é mulation and the Grand prix de l ' Acad é mie competition which allowed access to the prestigious Prix de l ' Acad é mie de France à Rome : " Nonetheless the chief end of architectural education at the É cole too often tended to become, not the design of architecture, but the production of mere paper projects aimed simply at winning the Prix de Rome; indeed, Larousse ' s dictionary in 1930 defi ned the purpose of the É cole thus: " L ' É cole pr é pare les artistes aux diff é rents concours pour le grand prix de Rome. " " 13 By the beginning of the 1960 ' s, the focus of research investigations shifted from the product to the making process , especially on those intellectual tasks which we call design process 14 . This was a major epistemological turn. Not only the object of study completely changed, but also, the philosophical framework which served as its paradigmatic reference, split radically from aesthetics to logics and scientifi c rationality. Christopher Alexander was the fi rst advocate of this dynamic with his now famous essay, Notes Toward the Synthesis of Form 15 , devoted completely to the issue of the design process. The subtitle to the Introduction was " the need for rationality " . The fi rst sentence not only announced the epistemological turn, but also set out the philosophical orientation of its whole program: " These notes are about the process of design; the process of inventing physical things which display new physical order, organization, form, in response to function. " 16 The design process was to be considered strictly within a general framework which can be identifi ed with the philosophy of making ; what Greek philosophers call poiesis 17 . Alexander delivered a detailed description and a conceptual representation of design process as an ' analysis / synthesis ' activity, analogous to the production model of rational knowledge. Without considering its antique philosophical origins (in Plato and Aristotle), the modern sources of this model can be located in the second and third precepts of Ren é Descartes ' Discourse on Method (1637):
" The second [the analysis precept] was to divide each of the problems I was examining in as many parts as I could, as many as should be necessary to solve them. The third, [the synthesis precept] to develop my thoughts in order, beginning with the simplest and easiest to understand matters, in order to reach by degrees, little by little, to the most complex knowledge, assuming an orderliness among them which did not at all naturally seem to follow one from the other." There can be no doubt then, that this epistemological turn started with the less complex vision of making : the utilitarian and rationalistic one 18 . By the end of the 1960 ' s, another theoretical framework, maybe the most popular, was proposed by Herbert A. Simon in his famous work The Sciences of the Artifi cial . This essay reaffi rms the poietic character (artefacts production) as the substance of the design process: " Design [...] is concerned with how things ought to be, with devising artefacts to attain goals. " 19 . Simon introduced however a new separation line between natural sciences epistemology, which is concerned with how things are , and artifi cial sciences epistemology, which deals with how things ought to be .
During the 1970 ' s and early 1980 ' s, several other investigations, more empirical in nature, tried to develop substantial descriptions of design ' s activities at a methodological level by observing designers at work. This shifted the focus of investigations from the process to the actors . However, this kind of research was generally rooted in cognitive psychology 20 . These scientifi c and methodo logical -oriented efforts began to be strongly criticised by the early 1980 ' s. Donald Sch ö n ' s account of design activities was signifi cant here. He argued that there was a general crisis of confi dence in professional knowledge, which had its sources in the epistemological basis upon which professional education had been established in the modern university since 19th century. This epistemology is one of technical rationality with its philosophical foundations in the positivist view of the relationships between theory and practice; that is, the philosophy underlying applied sciences 21 . In his chief research work, The Refl ective Practitioner 22 , Sch ö n proposed another epistemological shift which presents professional practices as refl ective conversations with problematic situations. He called this new design process epistemology " refl ection in action " , and suggested the architectural design studio tradition as an excellent methodological example of refl ection in action 23 . However, despite his refl ective character, Sch ö n ' s practitioner remains philosophically speaking in the poiesis realm, because Sch ö n considers designers basically as makers of artefacts:
" I see designing as a kind of making. Architects, landscape architects, interior or industrial or engineering designers, make physical objects that occupy space and have plastic and visual form. In a more general sense, a designer makes an image -a representation -of something to be brought to reality [...] . Artists make things and are, in this sense, designers. Indeed, the ancient Greeks used the term poetics to refer to the study of making things -poems being one category of things made. Professional practitioners are also makers of artefacts. " 24 In the next section, we propose a critical approach to what we have called the " logical turn " . As noted, since the 1970 ' s the focus of research has been to progressively direct attention to the actors of the project. This started with empirical investigations about designers and the way they tackle design situations. As the failures of certain modernist architectural ideas, especially as applied to housing became apparent, it became the turn of building occupants to be investigated. In general, most of these studies were rooted in social and human sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc.). Our principal argument is the following : when the time comes to understand and focus specifi cally on people (the actors of the project, their ways of being, their actions, their motivations and their mutual concerns), neither poiesis (philosophy of making), nor logic or philosophy of science are the most suited for this task. The framework of ethics (that is, practical philosophy) is, by nature, more appropriate, since ethics ' concern is the human person, his/ her way of life (how should I live ? ), and his/her relationships to his/ herself and to other persons.
The Framework of Ethics, or Design ' s Praxis
If the project, in architecture or in any design area, is by defi nition a project of , by , with and for persons (the actors or the stakeholders: client , architect , contractor , occupant , etc.), whether they are actively or passively concerned, then, a theoretical investigation about these persons cannot escape the anthropological question: what is the conception of the human person (the person of the designer, the occupant, the client, etc.) which underlies implicitly these theoretical efforts? In other words, what is the philosophical anthropology 25 which serves as the reference for such efforts? Can architecture as a discipline pretend to build its whole sustainability on these anthropological visions which conceive the designer as an artist , or as a problem solver (a practitioner who applies logical and scientifi c grounded methods), or as a refl ective practitioner according to Donald Sch ö n ' s account? Can architecture continue to conceive of the occupants as mere spectators of buildings ' beauty (according to some aesthetic doctrines), or as mere users of buildings (according to some utilitarian doctrines), or mere biological organisms (according to the functionalist and ergonomic doctrines), and fi nally, as beings whose behaviors are determined by the built environment (according to some behaviourist doctrines)?
As a discipline, ethics belongs to the general fi eld of practical philosophy. The " practical " idea, associated with this philosophy, has its origins in two philosophers ' works: Aristotle ' s writings about ethics 26 and politics, and Kant ' s writings about morals 27 in his Critique of pure practical reason . Since the nineteenth century, the word practical has usually been opposed to theoretical . Theory is considered as the main characteristic of science, and practice, which derives from praxis , refers to concrete applications of science. For the Ancient Greeks, where the word philosophy refers to a certain way of life 28 rather than to a set of speculative and abstract knowledge, the division between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy connects to the traditional and well-known division, admitted since Pythagoras, between the three main ways of life ( bios ) which characterise that society: life of pleasure and enjoyment, the active or political life ( bios politikos ), and the contemplative or theoretical life ( bios theoretikos ). Practical philosophy (which includes ethics) deals with the active life of citizens, who act within the city ( polis ), among , with and for their fellows.
For many decades, professional knowledges have been going through a crisis both epistemologically (an internal crisis), and in terms of the support they receive from society (social validity). This latter aspect, is often raised and reported, within all social activities, in the form of ethical problems or dilemmas. The scale of many of these ethical issues has overwhelmed the capability of many professional departments of universities to re-think theoretical frameworks and subsequently set guidelines for action in their respective domains of intervention. If bioethics, environmental ethics, business ethics, and of course the ethics of " political affairs " represent the most media-covered and investigated domains of the ethical turn , architecture, planning and design have also engaged substantial refl ections in this way. The increasing number of publications about ethics in architecture 29 is a strong indication in this sense.
The ethical turn is a consequence of the failure of a certain philosophical vision of human action. The rediscovery and rehabilitation of practical philosophy, after revisiting its Aristotelian origins, is considered in this turmoil situation as an alternative philosophy of action 30 . Hannah Arendt 31 , Paul Ric oe ur 32 , and Hans-Georg Gadamer 33 are principal interpreters and advocates of this philosophy in 20th century. In this paper we cannot embrace all the full range of complexity of the relationship between ethics and architecture. We prefer to limit our investigations to one polarity chosen for its fecundity and heuristic potential. This is Aristotle ' s distinction between the activity of production ( poiesis ), which is aimed to an external end (the thing or effect to be produced), and action ( praxis ), an activity which is an end of its own (that of acting well ). Hannah Arendt has developed a modern interpretation of this polarity, which she describes in terms of making ( poiesis ) and acting ( praxis ) 34 . How can the " poiesis / praxis " and " making / acting " couples inform architecture and the concept of project? We will start by giving some detailed descriptions of these concepts. After providing a brief review of the Aristotelian sources 35 , we decided to emphasise Hannah Arendt ' s philosophical interpretation.
The " Poiesis/Praxis " Polarity in Aristotle ' s Philosophy
The ideas of poiesis and praxis appear in the fi rst sentences of the Ethica Nicomachea :
" Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities [ praxis ], others are products apart from the activities that produce them [ poiesis ]. " 36
As noted previously, poiesis designates the activity of production, an activity aimed to an end beyond the agent (that is, the thing or the effect to be produced). Poiesis refers specifi cally to the transitive condition of the activity. Praxis , on the other hand, is an activity which is an end of its own. Similar to a musician who practices his instrument in order to learn how to play or practice well, the end which is aimed by praxis is nothing else than acting well . In this sense, praxis refers to the refl ective and immanent character of the activity, and its aim is nothing else than the perfection of the agent 37 . Thus, this activity does not tend to the achievement of some end or effect outside the agent, and the idea of conducting and helping the agent in order to be a best agent in a moral sense, is what Aristotle ' s ethics is all about. How does the concept of praxis comes to assume the conditions and requirements of ethics in Aristotle ' s work? As stated by the fi rst sentence of Ethica Nicomachea , it is the entire deeds of human being (art, inquiry, action and pursuit) which are put in a moral perspective: the orientation of these deeds towards the good 38 . The Aristotelian anthropology is expressed in such a moral mode that it is hard to imagine a theory or discourse about human action which can be neutral. In this anthropology, the concept of praxis expresses a particular relationship of the human being to him/herself during action. By keeping attention upon its own end, which is acting well , the praxis mode forces the agent to watch constantly his/her own attitudes and behaviors which he/she tries continually to improve. In this sense, the agent should be refl ective and deliberative: How should I act? Which good is the aim of my action? Which are the particular characteristics of the situation? What can be the consequences to me and to others? Which harm or problem can be produced by my action? It appears fi nally that poiesis can be described as an activity of representation or modelling (it pictures the thing to produce). On the other hand, praxis appears more as a questioning or refl ective activity (it constantly questions itself about its own conditions).
The " Making/Acting " Couple in Hannah Arendt ' s Thinking
Among twentieth century practical philosophers, Hannah Arendt has certainly developed the most comprehensive interpretation of the Greek polarity poiesis / praxis . In The Human Condition , she interprets this polarity in terms of making / acting or work / action . Early in the essay, she makes a distinction between three fundamental human activities: " [ … ] labor, work, and action. They are fundamental because each corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man. Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body [ … ] . The human condition of labor is life itself. Work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence [ … ] . Work provides an " artifi cial " world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. [ … ] Action, the only activity that goes directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. " 39 
The Making Character of the Work
Within the trilogy " labor , work , action " , which structures The Human Condition , the activity of work represents a hinge that allows us to understand the other two, particularly action . In fact, Arendt ' s central thesis is that, in the modern era, making has been progressively substituted by acting within the domain of human affairs, i.e. in politics. Three main characteristics describe making or the activity of work . They are: the durability and stability attributes of the work ; the reifi cation of its results; and the relationships of making to the categories of means and end .
The proper characteristic of work is its position within the unnaturalness of the human condition; work provides " an ' artifi cial ' world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings " 40 . The durability which distinguishes artifi cial things provides that ever-changing creature, i.e. man, with a stable and solid world without which he/she becomes homeless. Thus, artefacts inherit the role of objectifying the world, whose stability allows the ever-changing nature of man to recover and recognise each time his identity and his marks:
" From this viewpoint, the things of the world have the function of stabilizing human life, and their objectivity lies in the fact that [ … ] men, their ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve their sameness, that is, their identity, by being related to the same chair and the same table. In other words, against the subjectivity of men stands the objectivity of the man-made world [ … ] . " 41 Beyond durability and stability, the characteristic which singularly distinguishes the activity of making is the reifi cation of its results. That is the meaning of the Aristotelian concept of poiesis ; an activity which is aimed at an external end (the thing to be produced, an end which is distinct from the activity itself). The product ' s model or image, which are carried by the producer and guide him during the reifi cation process, can be recognised as some of the main features of the activity of work:
" The actual work of fabrication is performed under the guidance of a model in accordance with which the object is constructed. This model can be an image beheld by the eye of the mind or a blueprint in which the image has already found a tentative materialization through work. " 42 Finally, the fabricated thing, since it is considered as an external end to the activity which gives birth to it, drives the making of the work in the turmoil of the means/end scheme and the determinations by which it is characterised 43 . The fi nal product becomes as a tour from which once observes and designs the organisation of the process, and chooses and justifi es the means. In this sense, the produced thing gets a kind of sovereignty which reveals the primacy of the product upon the process: " The fi nal product organises the process of the work, decides upon the specialists who are needed, the co-operative tasks, and the number of participants and co-operators. Evaluation upon everything and everyone is made in terms of convenience and utility for the desired fi nal product, and nothing else. " 44 
The Human Condition of Action
Action occupies the most important status within the trilogy which structures The Human Condition . If the main character of work is the reifi cation of its results, action does not leave any perceptible result behind. However, this aspect does not seem suffi cient for Arendt. A fundamental aspect must be missing, though she prefers to put emphasis on two other characteristics without which any action is inconceivable. These are plurality and otherness :
" Action, the only activity that goes directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world." 45 " Living together " is the principal element which describes humans dwelling in the world. Therefore, action is performed in what Arendt calls the realm of " human affairs " , a domain which is concerned not by man ' s relationships to things, but man ' s relationships to other men: " [ … ] while the activity of work leaves monuments and documents behind it, which in general constitute the durableness of the world, action in common exist only if the actors sustain it." 46 In this sense, the result of action is nothing else than the polis , because, for Greeks, " not Athens, but the Athenians, were the polis " 47 .
Within the ideas of plurality and otherness, we can now perceive a fundamental link and affi nity between any action and speech . If no action can be considered without other ' s presence (whether this presence is physical or mental), the relationship which is developed between man and this " other " is mostly initiated and conveyed by speech, and can end in a narrative, tale, or story form:
" Action, as distinguished from fabrication, is never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act. Action and speech need the surrounding presence of others no less than fabrication needs the surrounding presence of nature for its material, and of a world in which to place the fi nished product. " 48 This privileged link between action and speech sets a space to consider two other fundamental aspects of human action. These are the ideas of initiative and disclosure of the agent (the who of the action) to his fellows by words and deeds 49 :
" With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confi rm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance.
[ … ] To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein , " to begin " , " to lead " , and eventually " to rule " , indicates), to set something into motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin agere ). Because they are initium , newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action.
[ … ] This beginning [ … ] is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who is beginner himself. " 50 By our ability to initiate actions and launch speech within the web of relationships which constitute the realm of human affairs, we disclose ourselves to our fellows, and we provide an answer to the question asked of every newcomer: Who are you ?, because what speech and action disclose is really the subject 51 of the action:
" Without the disclosure of the agent in the act, action loses its specifi c character and becomes one form of achievement among others. It is then no less a means to an end than making is a means to produce an object. This happens whenever human togetherness is lost [ … ] . " 52
Some Ethics ' Lenses for the Concept of " Project " in Architecture
Following this philosophical journey, we can now recognise two basic anthropological features expressed by the poiesis / praxis and making / acting polarities. These are the two fundamental relationships which describe the human condition on which philosophers, from Aristotle to Heidegger, had put emphasis: man ' s relation to things and man ' s relation to persons (others persons and one ' s own person). The former is generally a predominant concern of aesthetics where the latter, as we noted, is mostly a basic concern of ethics and politics. How can we now view the concept of project in architecture, especially its three main components, under the lenses of ethics?
Considering the three principal constituents of the project in architecture ( building , process , actors ), our survey so far has shown that the making (or poietic ) vision, whether aesthetic or logical/scientifi c in orientation, underlies most of the theoretical discourses on architecture. This is a consequence of the historical fact that architecture as a discipline was primarily conceived and devoted to the purpose of building. So, the claim of our paper ' s title for " more acting and less making " 53 does not aim to diminish or devalue this constituent side of architecture. It rather invites and urges thinking in architecture to promote and exalt acting in order to advance its importance to the same level as making .
If we are now to develop an understanding of the project in architecture from the perspective of man ' s relation to persons , it will be natural to start with the issue of the actors , that is, to give back the project to whom it is a project. And, instead of dealing with each actor fi gure separately (client, architect, contractor, occupant), we should rather try to hold a common view, that is, a common anthropological conception of the actors, which gathers them and serves as a common anthropological ground for the project (according to the conditions of plurality , otherness , and living together in Hannah Arendt ' s thinking). We propose to consider all the actors as " project ing beings " , since every actor is able to bring initiatives into the design situation: every actor is able to initiate speech and/or actions (i.e. projects) in his/her own domain of skills. Actors are also, beyond their respective special skills, practical persons ( praxis ), whose actions or speech are aimed at achieving a good life with and for the others. They acknowledge the plurality and otherness of their fellows, within whom each one discloses him/herself by words 54 and deeds .
This common representation of the actors as projecting beings brings about new understandings of the two other constituents of the project: the design process and the building . Since the project is, above all, the project of the actors, the entire design process can be regarded now as a federating setting within which all the specifi c projects of the actors fi nd their expression. If this federating characteristic is to be considered under the lens of ethics, then design process can be viewed as " a concord 55 of several projects " (a joint project), i.e. a practical , refl ective , and deliberative process:
" Some see practitioners ' refl ection-in-action as a largely psychological process of reframing problems, as process of changing one ' s mind (Sch ö n 1983); I see such re-cognition as integral to deliberation in which parties together learn about fact, value, and strategy all together. " 56 Finally, one of the ways to advance the acting side of architecture is to balance the strength and power of the dominant aesthetic vision of building: buildings as works of art . We propose to consider buildings as " works in project " . Two theoretical essays on architecture can be specifi cally helpful in this respect. The fi rst derives from Robert Prost ' s writings and it presents buildings as " works in process " : " We want to draw attention on the possibility to consider architectural phenomena as works in process, rather than works which only fi nd their status and their total and fi nal legitimacy during their creation moment -as it is the fact with works of art. " 57 " Rather than investigating architectural solutions from the unique question: what constitutes them?, I will introduce three additional questions: to which aims, goals and utilities they are responding to? How they are composed?, and fi nally, how they are transformed?" 58 The second one is Philippe Boudon ' s description of buildings as " open works " or " open construction " 59 ; opened to the projects and initiatives of their occupants. The concept of open work refers to that idea which views the building, once it is designed and delivered to occupation, as " an infrastructure, a basic framework, within which the occupants would be able to give a more or less free rein to their own ideas [that is, their own initiatives or projects] in both a qualitative [ … ] and quantitative [ … ] sense." 60 
Conclusion
Since the beginning of the design professions, the idea of design has been associated with a poietic vision, that of the devising and making of the artefacts. Design was thought to belong essentially to the realm of things. According to this vision, Herbert Simon described design as an activity which " is concerned with how things ought to be, with devising artefacts to attain goals. " 61 This defi nition may assume that problems lie generally in man ' s environment, and the role of design is to bring some modifi cations to the environment to make it much better. By the beginning of this new millennium, the discourse of ethics, specifi cally virtue ethics (Aristotelian ethics), shows regularly that problematic matters lie not always and necessarily in the environment but mostly in humans ' way of being: their ways of life and dwelling with their fellows. Therefore, it is sometimes the human person which can be considered as an existing situation to change into a preferred one 62 ; that ' s what education is about. So, we would add to Simon ' s defi nition: " Design is also concerned with how humans (especially designers ) would have to be , by educating them to become not only best poietical but also best practical persons" . This is what " design as praxis " really means; it is primarily about the designer ' s own ethos , not just about things.
Notes
It is the case of the 5.
pedagogy by project in educational sectors, or the management by project in administration departments, or urban planning by project , etc. For more, see the interesting taxonomy developed by Boutinet (1992) in order to present the several categories of projects. We do not include non-human entities ( " 6.
Actants " in Bruno Latour ' s or Edgar Morin ' s words) under the term " actors " . This choice derives from our ethical-philosophical framework. At fi rst sight, this typology may seem somewhat reductionist 7.
in the two following aspects: 1) the apparent exclusive emphasis of the discourses on one dimension only and 2) the historical sequence of emergence of the three elements and its -apparent -determinism. One needs to remember that our aim here is not to provide a defi nitive theory of the architectural project, but a pragmatic model which is meant to help us to think about the project more thoroughly and more adequately. In other words, and in such perspective, the purpose of a theoretical model is not to stop the thinking process but, on the contrary, to stimulate it. Moreover, when our model tells that for instance aesthetics is the main focus of architectural discourses, it does not mean of course that the other dimensions (logics, ethics) are totally absent. Finally, there is no determinism, no evolution, and no philosophy of history related to the observed historical sequence. The threefold division stated in the chapter 3 of his 8.
First Book , " fi rmitas" (fi rmness), " utilitas" (utility) et " venustas" (delight, grace), became, since Renaissance, the core of the vitruvian theory of architecture, even though these are not the principles which had been privileged by Vitruvius him self. According to Germann, Vitruvius valued rather six other principles found in the Greek sources: Order, Arrangement, Proportion, Symmetry, Decoration and Distribution ( Book 1 , chapter 2) According to Aristotle, 17. poiesis is an activity which is aimed to produce a work or an effect outside the agent. By the opposite, praxis is an activity which constitutes an end of its own. We will deal more about these concepts in the last part of this paper. By the early 1970 ' s, Alexander will abandon completely this 18.
vision of design process, and initiate a radical shift which leads him to develop another approach to design, based on an empirical orientation known by his other major work, Action? , New York, Basic Books, 1983 . See the chapter 3 in Sch ö n (1983), entitled " Design as a 23.
Refl ective Conversation with the Situation" .
